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WRONGFUL DEATH: DOES THE NCAA HAVE
AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO PROTECT ITS
STUDENT-ATHLETES?

RAE-ANNA SOLLESTRE

I. INTRODUCTION
As of 2018, there were 1,036,842 participants in high school football, and
many of those players dreamed of becoming a collegiate athlete or even
becoming a professional football player.1 Of those participants, only 73,557
participants or an estimated 6.9 percent proceed to play football at a college
level, and only 1.6 percent of college football players can achieve their dream
of competing on a professional level.2 For many young football players, college
is a step to their future; it is a necessary step to becoming one of the lucky few.
It was at the collegiate level that Jordan McNair was working to be the best that
he could be; it was at this level that McNair’s journey abruptly and tragically
ended. Due to decisions made by staff at the University of Maryland
(Maryland), a National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) memberinstitution, McNair suffered from exertional heat stroke during a conditioning
session and tragically died.3 Thus, McNair’s family has sought legal remedy
for the actions of both the football coaching staff and the university; however,
the question of whether the NCAA should also be held liable for the actions of
its member-institution needs answering.
 Rae-Anna Sollestre was the 2019–20 Sources Editor of the Marquette Sports Law Review and received
a Juris Doctor from Marquette University Law School and a Sports Law Certificate from the National Sports
Law Institute in May 2020. Sollestre would like to thank the members of the Marquette Sports Law Review
and her fellow Editorial Board Members for all of their hard work.
1. Estimated Probability of Competing in Professional Athletics, NCAA.ORG (Apr. 3, 2019),
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/estimated-probability-competing-professional-athletics.
2. Id.
3. Rick Maese & Roman Stubbs, U-Md. Releases Report on Jordan McNair, Laying Out Timeline that
Led to Player’s Death, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/u-mdboard-of-regents-releases-report-on-jordan-mcnair-laying-out-timeline-that-led-to-playersdeath/2018/09/21/49331ea0-bda9-11e8-b7d2-0773aa1e33da_story.html?utm_term=.2551803bc86e.

SOLLESTRE – COMMENT 30.2

394

9/11/2020 10:32 PM

MARQUET T E SPORT S L AW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:2

Part II of this Comment will discuss the facts of the McNair case to provide
the background of this issue and information regarding heat stroke and wrongful
death in athletics. To properly assess potential NCAA liability, Part III will
provide the legal authority including the choice of law and applicable wrongful
death statutes focusing largely on Maryland4 and Indiana5 law. Part IV will then
assess whether the NCAA has a duty to protect the health and safety of studentathletes and thus potentially be liable for McNair’s death in Maryland or
Indiana. This Comment will shed some light on why it is unlikely that the
NCAA will be liable for the wrongful death of a student-death in Maryland or
Indiana.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On May 29th, 2018, Jordan McNair, 19 years old,6 attended Maryland’s team
conditioning session, which occurred after the team’s four-week break, at the
practice field instead of the originally scheduled location, Maryland Stadium;7
however, the session was held immediately after a team break indicating no
acclimatization occurred.8 Acclimatization is defined as a gradual increase in
practice intensity with modified work-to-rest-ratio,9 which did not occur.10
Additionally, the sudden change from the Maryland Stadium to the practice
fields did not allow enough time for the training staff to have a trauma bag or
cold water immersion readily available.11 A trauma bag contains medical
supplies including oxygen tanks and masks, AEDs, inhalers, and artificial
airways,12 and cold water immersion utilizes ice and cold water to rapidly cool
a person’s body temperature.13
After the team flexibility and dynamic warmups took place, players ran in
groups of ten for 110-yard runs, which were being monitored by the Head
4. The McNair incident occurred in Maryland, so it would be possible for a claim to be filed in this state.
5. The NCAA is located in Indiana; therefore, it may be possible for an Indiana court to have jurisdiction.
6. Maese & Stubbs, supra note 3.
7. WALTERS INC., AN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF PROCEDURES AND PROTOCOLS RELATED TO THE
JUNE 2018 DEATH OF A UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND FOOTBALL STUDENT-ATHLETE 25–26 (2018),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4918313/Investigation-in-death-of-Maryland-football.pdf
[hereinafter Independent Evaluation] (providing facts of the incident).
8. Id. at 25.
9. Id. at 6.
10. Id. at 64 (suggesting encouragements and reminders to the student-athletes to follow their individual
workout plan over the four-week break did not adequately indicate individual fitness).
11. Id. at 26, 62.
12. Id. at 10-11.
13. NCAA, 2014–15 NCAA SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, at 41 (Aug. 2014),
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/MD15.pdf [hereinafter Sports Medicine Handbook].
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Football Athletic Trainer.14 McNair ran his first seven runs within the allotted
time frame; however, during the last repetition, McNair struggled to finish and
received medical attention from the athletic trainers on the field who noticed
several heat exhaustion symptoms including back and heat cramps, fatigue, and
low back pain.15 Thirty-four minutes passed between the time McNair first
started exhibiting symptoms and his removal from the field, but the training staff
never assessed or recorded McNair’s temperature or vital signs.16 Ice packs and
ice towels were used in an attempt to cool him17 despite the availability of cold
water immersion after he was moved to the training room.18 McNair’s health
quickly deteriorated resulting in calling the team physician, 9-1-1, and campus
security; however, due to inefficiencies and confusion (e.g., training staff’s
failure to immediately call 9-1-1 at the onset of symptoms and notify campus
security, and failure to meet emergency personnel), McNair did not arrive at the
hospital until forty minutes later—about an hour and a half after he first
presented symptoms.19 Upon arrival at the hospital, his temperature was
recorded at 106 degrees Fahrenheit,20 which is above the exertional heat stroke
symptom of a temperature over 105 degrees Fahrenheit.21
As a result of these mistakes and inefficiencies, McNair died on June 13th
as a result of heat stroke.22 Maryland’s football staff failed to supply the
necessary and proper medical supplies, determine field temperature, and
acclimatize athletes.23 Additionally, the death of McNair is considered a
catastrophic event according to both the “University of Maryland Athletics
Critical Incident” Guideline and the NCAA Manual requiring prompt
documentation of the event, communication with the Critical Incident
Management Team, and a detailed summary.24 Maryland admitted their football

14. Independent Evaluation, supra note 7, at 26-27 (recognizing that several players appeared fatigued).
15. See id. at 28.
16. Id. at 29-30.
17. Id. at 64.
18. Id. at 63.
19. Id. at 31-32.
20. Alex Kirshner, Jordan McNair’s Death: What We Know About Maryland and DJ Durkin’s Role,
SBNATION (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2018/8/11/17678652/jordan-mcnairdeath-investigation-maryland.
21. Independent Evaluation, supra note 7, at 16.
22. Kirshner, supra note 20.
23. Independent Evaluation, supra note 7, at 63–64.
24. Id. at 18-19; NCAA, 2018-19 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, art. 3, 3.2.4.19 at 12 (Aug. 1, 2018).
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training and medical staff failed to diagnose and treat Jordan McNair’s
exertional heat stroke, 25 and subsequently, Maryland fired its head coach.26
Early recognition and treatment of exertional heat stroke is necessary to
have the best chance at survival.27 Experts have determined the survival rate of
exertional heat stroke is high.28 From 1960–2017, 145 heat stroke cases resulted
in death connected to football practices alone.29 As a result, the Annual Survey
of Football Injury—a survey prepared for the NCAA, the American Football
Coaches Association, National Athletic Trainers’ Association30—urges a
continuous effort to prevent heat stroke in football especially because most
deaths occur during practice, not competition.31 Due to this knowledge, the
NCAA and all of its member-institutions should be aware of both procedures
and statistics regarding exertional heat stroke in football. Therefore, because
Maryland is an NCAA member-institution, it is appropriate to assess whether
the failures by the University of Maryland’s staff to both diagnose and treat
Jordan McNair could cause the NCAA to be liable for Maryland’s actions.
III. LEGAL AUTHORITY
Due to the NCAA's knowledge of heat stroke-related deaths involving
football players and the University of Maryland's failure to follow NCAA
Manual principles, guidelines, and regulations, it is important to determine
whether the NCAA can be liable for the wrongful death of athletes that have
suffered from exertional heat stroke.32 The Manual requires active member
institutions to report catastrophic sports injuries, which includes heat stroke,
annually to the NCAA and requires student-athletes to complete an annual
health and safety survey.33 Additionally, the NCAA produces a medical
25. Rick Maese et al., Maryland Football Player Death: University of Maryland Apologizes to Jordan
McNair’s Family, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/terrapinsinsider/wp/2018/08/14/university-of-maryland-apologizes-to-jordan-mcnair-family-for-mistakes-that-ourtraining-staff-made/?utm_term=.bb8e19a84748.
26. Heather Dinich & Darren Rovell, Maryland Terrapins Football Coach DJ Durkin Fired One Day
After Reinstatement, ESPN, https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/25137549/maryland-terrapinscoach-dj-durkin-fired-wake-probe?device=featurephone (last visited Apr. 24, 2020) (Maryland’s President
fired coach despite reinstatement of coach following placement on administrative leave).
27. Independent Evaluation, supra note 7, at 4, 6 (recommending aggressive treatment to lower body
temperature within thirty minutes of symptom onset).
28. KRISTEN L. KUCERA, ET AL., ANNUAL SURVEY OF FOOTBALL INJURY RESEARCH 14 (2018),
https://nccsir.unc.edu/files/2013/10/Annual-Football-2017-Fatalities-FINAL.pdf.
29. Id.
30. Id. at i.
31. Id. at 14.
32. NCAA, supra note 24, at art. 2, 2.2.3.
33. Id. at art. 3, 3.2.4.19-3.2.4.20.
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handbook, which has not been updated since 2014, consisting of guidelines—
not mandatory rules—for member-institutions to develop their own sports
medicine policies according to best current practices.34 The NCAA only
intended for the handbook to provide “guidelines for each institution for
developing sports medicine policies appropriate for its intercollegiate athletics
program . . . . In other words, these guidelines are not mandates. . . .”35 The
member-institutions, not the NCAA, are responsible for the development and
establishment of appropriate sports medicine policies according to the best
practices.36 According to the Sports Medicine Handbook’s guidelines on
exertional heat stroke, more deaths from heat stroke occurred from 2005–2009
than any other period in the last thirty years, and it is the third leading cause of
sudden deaths in athletes.37 Guideline 2C in the Sports Medicine Handbook
provides the recommended practices to prevent exertional heat stroke including
annual initial physical evaluations, previous heat strokes and their risk factors,
gradual acclimatization, hydration status, and record of environmental
conditions.38
In the state of Maryland, a wrongful death action can commence against a
person who causes another person’s death.39 The statute’s definition of “person”
includes, but is not limited to, “individual[s], . . . fiduciar[ies], or
representative[s] of any partnership, firm, association, public or private
corporation, or any other entity.”40 Maryland permits a deceased’s parent to
initiate a wrongful death action as long as the parent was not convicted of a
crime under the relevant statute.41 This action must be filed within three years
of the person’s death unless the death was caused by an “occupational disease”
defined in the statute or criminal homicide under State or federal law caused the
wrongful death.42 For a tortfeasor43 to be liable for the deceased’s injuries, the
actual harm must be within the scope of danger that can be expected or

34. SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 2.
35. Id.
36. Bradley v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 249 F. Supp.3d 149, 174 (D.D.C. 2017).
37. SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 39; see also KUCERA, ET AL., supra note 28, at 15
(requiring staff to know the temperature and humidity during practices and games because a we-bulb
temperature at or above eighty-two degrees Fahrenheit is a risk factor for exertional heat stroke).
38. SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 39-40.
39. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-902(a) (West 1974).
40. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-901(d) (West 1983).
41. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-904(a) (West 2012).
42. Id. at § 3-904(g).
43. Tortfeasor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining a tortfeasor as a person that commits
a tortious act).
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anticipated.44 When multiple negligent acts or omissions have occurred
concerning the deceased's death, liability can be avoided should there be an
intervening act or omission that is a "superseding cause" of the decedent’s
harm.45 “Negligence by a subsequent actor breaks the chain of causation when
the action by the subsequent actor is extraordinary and not reasonably
foreseeable.”46
Due to the NCAA’s headquarters being located in Indianapolis, Indiana, this
wrongful death claim could also be attempted in Indiana. In Indiana, a personal
representative of a deceased person whose death was caused by another’s
wrongful conduct is permitted to initiate a lawsuit against the latter if the
deceased would have been able to initiate his own suit against the latter for
injury for the same wrongful conduct.47 This action must be brought within two
years of the deceased’s death.48 Additionally, Indiana permits wrongful death
actions against corporate entities.49
Torts, like wrongful death, are governed differently depending on the state’s
“choice of law."50 On the one hand, many states like Maryland follow the First
Restatement's traditional test, which governs almost all tort issues,51 providing
that torts are governed within the state that “the last event necessary to make an
actor liable for an alleged tort takes place."52 On the other hand, other states like
Indiana follow the Second Restatement’s significant relationship test.53 This
test considers “(1) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (2)
the residence and place of incorporation and place of business of the parties; and
(3) the place where the parties’ relationship is centered.”54
In this case, the University of Maryland, an NCAA member-institution,
already admitted its fault for the role it played in the premature death of Jordan

44. Copsey v. Park, 160 A.3d 623, 637 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2017).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 639.
47. IND. CODE § 34-23-1-1(1) (1998).
48. Id.
49. See 12 AM. JUR. TRIALS 317 (2018).
50. See Jed J. Borghei, Note, Class Action Fairness: A Mature Solution to the 23(B)(3) Choice of Law
Problem, 95 GEO. L.J. 1645, 1647 (2007).
51. Id.
52. Id. (citing Restatement (First) Conflict of Laws § 377 (Am. Law Inst. 1934)); see Richards v. U.S.,
369 U.S. 1, 16 (1962) (providing the applicable law in wrongful death is generally where the act occurred);
see also Waranka v. Wadena Ins. Co., 832 N.W.2d 133, 138–139 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013) (precluding wrongful
death actions taking place outside of Wisconsin state lines).
53. See Borghei, supra note 50, at 1647.
54. Simon v. U.S., 341 F.3d 193, 200 (3rd Cir. 2003).
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McNair;55 therefore, it is undisputed that Maryland can be liable for the failures
on the medical and training staffs’ part to properly diagnose and treat McNair.56
However, there is still an issue of whether the NCAA could be liable through its
member-institution for the death of McNair.
IV. NCAA’S POTENTIAL LIABILITY FOR THE DEATH OF JORDAN MCNAIR
A. NCAA and the Health and Safety of Student-Athletes
To address potential liability, it is important to first address whether the
NCAA has a duty to keep its student-athletes safe. “A duty of care may . . .
arise where [a supervising entity] assumes such a duty, either gratuitously or
voluntarily.”57 The assumed duty must arise out of enough specific, affirmative
action to constitute voluntarily undertaking the duty.58 Once this duty is
assumed, the imposition of liability incurs only when the supervising entity fails
to act reasonably,59 but promises and guidelines are not sufficient to indicate the
entity actually oversaw and controlled the other entity.60 When a supervising
entity provides guidelines for alleged wrongdoing, the supervising entity is not
liable for any subordinate entity’s conduct outside of the provided guidelines61
because an entity’s provision of guidelines is not indicative of any control or
oversight.62 Thus, it is unlikely that a court would find the NCAA has an
affirmative duty to protect its student-athletes’ health and safety because the
NCAA never voluntarily assumed the duty to protect its student-athletes.
A voluntary undertaking of a duty cannot be supported by broad
generalizations.63 McCants v. National Collegiate Athletic Association was
brought as a part of a class action suit against both the NCAA and one of its
member-institutions, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill alleging
negligence and breach of fiduciary duties.64 The plaintiffs alleged the NCAA
had undertaken the voluntary duty to protect the education and educational

55. Maese & Stubbs, supra note 3.
56. Id.
57. Lanni v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 42 N.E.3d 542, 550 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Yost v.
Wabash Coll., 3 N.E.3d 509, 517 (Ind. 2014)).
58. McCants v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 3d 732, 740 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (finding broad,
generalized declarations are insufficient to prove voluntary undertaking of a duty).
59. Lanni, 42 N.E.3d at 550.
60. Yost v. Wabash Coll., 3 N.E.3d 509, 519 (Ind. 2014); see also McCants, 201 F. Supp.3d at 743.
61. See Yost, 3 N.E.3d at 519.
62. See Bradley v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 249 F. Supp.3d 149, 174 (D.D.C. 2017).
63. McCants, 201 F. Supp.3d at 740.
64. Id. at 736.
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opportunities of student-athletes65 and utilized the NCAA’s governing
documents and statements made to the public through public representations in
their attempt to illustrate that the NCAA owed a duty to the plaintiffs to provide
“academically sound” educational opportunities to student-athletes.66 However,
the court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim because there was no proof the NCAA
had a legal duty to protect student-athletes’ education resulting from a voluntary
undertaking.67 The court found the assertions made by the NCAA were not
specific enough to either the NCAA or the plaintiffs.68 Additionally, the court
elaborated and determined that an activity’s regulation is not equivalent to
engaging or controlling that activity; therefore, it would not be appropriate to
find the supervising entity to be voluntarily undertaking that duty.69
Because the NCAA has not voluntarily undertaken the duty to protect
student-athletes, it is unlikely that a court would find the NCAA has a duty to
protect its student-athletes. Like in McCants where the plaintiff relied upon the
NCAA’s governing documents in its attempt to illustrate the NCAA voluntarily
asserted a duty to protect the educational opportunities of its student-athletes,70
it is likely that the plaintiff, in this case, would rely upon both the NCAA Manual
and the NCAA Sports Medicine Handbook to show that the NCAA has a duty
to protect the health and safety of student-athletes. However, comparable to
McCants where the court found the basis of the plaintiff’s assertion to be
insufficient to constitute a voluntary undertaking by the NCAA,71 a court would
also likely find, in the McNair case, the use of the Manual and the Handbook to
be inadequate to support the claim that the NCAA had a duty to protect studentathlete health and safety created from a voluntary undertaking because the
Manual and the Handbook were meant to be guidelines—not regulations.
Therefore, the broad generalizations made in NCAA governing documents
regarding exertional heat stroke do not support the claim that the NCAA
affirmatively and voluntarily asserted the duty to protect its student-athletes.
The provision of exertional heat stroke prevention and treatment in the
NCAA Sports Medicine Handbook only serves as guidelines, not mandatory
rules; 72 therefore, the NCAA did not affirmatively undertake the duty to protect

65. Id. at 738.
66. Id. at 740–41.
67. Id. at 742 (finding even if the NCAA made promises to provide education to student-athletes, those
promises would not constitute a voluntarily undertaking).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 745.
70. Id. at 741.
71. Id. at 744.
72. Lanni v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 42 N.E.3d 542, 553 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
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its student-athletes.73 In Lanni v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, the
plaintiff fenced as a student-athlete at an NCAA member-institution competing
in a competition.74 After her competition, the plaintiff was struck in the eye
while she was within the designated waiting area resulting in severe injury.75
Hence, the plaintiff filed suit claiming the NCAA breached its duty to both her
and other student-athletes.76 After the plaintiff’s injury, the NCAA and its
Fencing Committee discussed the issues regarding the current layout of fencing
competitions and determined that the fencing strips were too close to each
other.77 Even so, the court concluded the NCAA owed no duties to studentathlete health and safety because the NCAA did not act in any way to indicate
it had a duty to supervise or control its member-institutions.78
While it is “commendable” for the NCAA to want to be actively involved
in their member-institutions provision of safety of student-athletes,79 a
supervising entity providing guidelines and expressing disapproval for the
alleged wrongdoing is not liable for their subordinate’s conduct done outside of
the guidelines.80 The duty of care can result from “affirmative, deliberate
conduct”81 on the actor’s part to assume such a duty of care to perform the task
at issue, but the plaintiff failed to illustrate the affirmative action necessary to
prove the NCAA was responsible for member-institution oversight, directly or
indirectly, regarding student-athlete safety.82 The evidence proved the NCAA
only has duties to provide information and guidance to member-institutions and
their student-athletes regarding the safety of student-athletes.83 While
compliance checks occur at member-institutions by the NCAA, “[a]ctual
oversight and control cannot be imputed merely from the fact that the NCAA
has promulgated rules and regulations and required compliance with” them.84
The NCAA’s provision of guidelines and regulations is not sufficient to
prove it owed student-athletes like Jordan McNair a duty to protect their health
and safety.85 Unlike Lanni where the NCAA inspected the competition site
73. Id. at 550.
74. Id. at 546.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 548.
77. Id. at 553.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 550.
81. Id. at 550.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 553.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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before the plaintiff's injury,86 the NCAA did not inspect the conditioning site
before McNair's exertional heat stroke, which resulted in his untimely death.
However, similarly to Lanni where the NCAA has provided regulations to
protect student-athletes in fencing competitions,87 the NCAA, in this case, has
also produced a Sports Medicine Handbook to provide guidelines to prevent and
treat exertional heat stroke. The NCAA’s provision of guidance regarding
exertional heat stroke is not indicative of the NCAA having a duty to its studentathletes’ health and safety, like in Lanni where the court determined the NCAA
only had a duty to provide information and guidance regarding the health and
safety of student-athletes.88 Additionally, comparable to the court in Lanni’s
determination that actual oversight and control results from conduct to
affirmatively assume that duty,89 the NCAA, in this case, has not affirmatively
assumed the duty to provide actual oversight and control over the health and
safety of its student-athletes due to both statements in the NCAA Manual and
the NCAA Sports Medicine Handbook.90 Because the NCAA has not
affirmatively undertaken the duty to protect its student-athletes and only
provides guidelines for exertional health and safety, the NCAA duty to studentathlete health and safety exists only to the extent of providing information and
guidelines to member-institutions regarding health and safety.
At times, medical decisions are necessary to protect the health and safety of
student-athletes, but those decisions are not subject to NCAA control and
oversight.91 The plaintiff, in Bradley v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association, was a student-athlete playing field hockey at a member-institution
who was hit in the head during a game and suffered concussion symptoms;
however, she was not advised to refrain from practicing or playing whilst
experiencing symptoms.92 Because she was not told to sit out, she continued
playing and practicing in field hockey games.93 Plaintiff asserted the “NCAA
undertook and assumed a duty to protect the physical and mental well-being of
all student-athletes participating in intercollegiate sports . . . [and] a duty to

86. Id.
87. See id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. NCAA, supra note 24, at art. 2, 2.2.3 (placing the responsibility of student-athlete health and safety
on NCAA member-institutions); SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 2 (providing only guidance
and recommendations, not "rigid requirements" for member-institutions to create their own rules for studentathlete medical safety).
91. See Bradley v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 249 F. Supp.3d 149, 173 (D.D.C. 2017).
92. Id. at 156–57.
93. Id. at 157.
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protect student-athletes from brain injuries.”94 The court found the Sports
Medicine Handbook produced by the NCAA only provided general guidance,
and it was up to the member-institutions to establish their own sports medicine
policies for their student-athletes.95 This handbook did not establish a standard
of care but deferred sports medicine policies to the member-institutions to
develop.96 Furthermore, the NCAA could not discipline universities for the
failure to adhere to NCAA purposes and policies and in that same vein, the
NCAA has no right to control or direct treatment of student-athletes by
healthcare providers at the member-institution.97
The provision of guidelines for medical treatment by a supervising entity
does not give the entity a right to control those decisions.98 Unlike in Bradley,
where it is unclear whether medical or training staff checked on the plaintiff to
determine if she was "play ready," Jordan McNair was treated by training staff
when initial symptoms occurred.99 However, similar to the Bradley court’s
finding that the NCAA is only responsible for providing member-institution
guidance,100 the only duty owed to student-athletes like Jordan from the NCAA
is to provide informative guidance to member-institutions about exertional heat
stroke prevention. Comparable to Bradley where the NCAA provided
concussion recommendations and guidelines in the Sports Medicine
Handbook,101 exertional heat stroke risk factors, prevention, and treatment
guidelines were also provided in that same handbook by the NCAA. 102 Thus,
the duty to provide member-institutions was fulfilled in this case. A court is
likely to find the guidelines provided to Maryland and the other memberinstitutions by the NCAA could not support the idea that the NCAA voluntarily
undertook the duty of health and safety, analogous to Bradley where the court
found the rules the NCAA implemented for member-institutions regarding
concussion protocol to be insufficient to prove that the NCAA was actually
involved or actively controlling concussion protocols at their memberinstitutions.103 Additionally, the court in Bradley held the NCAA has no control
over how a member-institution’s health care providers treat student-athletes,104
94. Id. at 168.
95. Id. at 174.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Independent Evaluation, supra note 7, at 27-32.
100. Bradley, 249 F. Supp.3d at 174.
101. Id.
102. SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 39.
103. Bradley, 249 F. Supp.3d at 168.
104. Id. at 174.
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so the NCAA should not be responsible for the medical decisions of Maryland’s
training staff in the treatment of Jordan McNair because the guidelines provided
in the NCAA Sports Medicine Handbook are mere recommendations for NCAA
member-institutions to craft their own policies fulfilling the only duty of the
NCAA to student-athlete health and safety.
For the NCAA to be liable for the Jordan McNair’s death, an assessment of
whether the NCAA has a duty to protect the health and safety of student-athletes
is necessary, which can result from specific affirmative conduct.105 The
provision of guidelines by the supervising entity is insufficient to prove that the
supervising entity was in control or oversaw compliance with those
guidelines.106 It is unlikely that a court will find the NCAA owed an affirmative
duty to protect student-athlete safety because the guidelines regarding exertional
heat stroke are not indicative of the NCAA’s control or oversight of those
guidelines—including directing or controlling medical treatment—and simply
providing guidelines cannot support a claim of an affirmative duty.
B. Liability in Maryland
Because the harm inflicted upon Jordan McNair occurred in the state of
Maryland, the potential liability of the NCAA should first be assessed based on
the application of Maryland law. In Maryland, a wrongful death action “may be
maintained against a person whose wrongful act causes the death of another,”107
which can be incurred against “an individual, . . . or any partnership, firm,
association, public or private corporation or entity.”108 A wrongful act is
defined as “an act, neglect, or default . . . . which would have entitled the party
injured to maintain an action and recover damages” if not for death.109 This
definition requires a showing by the plaintiff that the wrongful act was a
“proximate cause” of death.110 Additionally, it must be proven that the
defendant’s alleged wrongful act more likely than not caused death.111 If the
defendant has a duty to protect the deceased, the wrongful act done must
105. McCants v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 3d, 732, 740 (M.D.N.C. 2016).
106. See Bradley, 249 F. Supp.3d at 174.
107. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-902 (1974).
108. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-901 (1983) (emphasis added).
109. Id.
110. Fennell v. S. Md. Hosp. Ctr. Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 211 (Md. 1990) (discussing the defendant’s wrongful
act does not need to be the only cause but should have contributed substantially to the injury); see Weimer v.
Hetrick, 525 A.2d 643, 652 (Md. 1987) (finding it is the plaintiff’s responsibility to prove under the
preponderance of the evidence standard the defendant’s wrongful act proximately caused the death).
111. Fennell, 580 A.2d at 211; Weimer, 525 A.2d at 652; See also State of Md. v. Manor Real Estate &
Trust Co., 176 F.2d 414, 418 (4th Cir. 1949) (applying Maryland laws holding actual proof is required to
prove that if not for the defendant's action, then the injury or death would not have occurred).
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constitute negligence on the defendant's part and be a substantial part of the
deceased's death.112
Before the question of whether the NCAA can be liable for Jordan McNair’s
death, a duty must exist for Maryland to protect its student-athletes’ health and
safety.113 It has been established that a special relationship can create a duty
when one party voluntarily undertakes that duty requiring the party to act as a
reasonably prudent person,114 and many courts have found that universities’
special relationship with student-athletes require universities to “provide
preventative measures in the event of a medical emergency.”115 Because of this,
it is likely a court would find Maryland owed a duty to reasonably protect its
student-athletes, which could be the basis of liability for wrongful death action.
To assess whether the NCAA could be liable for the actions of Maryland,
the doctrines of vicarious liability or respondeat superior must be assessed. In
Maryland, a corporate employer can be held liable for its employee’s tortious
conduct when the employee acts within the scope of his or her employment.116
Acts conducted to benefit the employer's business with authorization constitute
within the scope of employment.117 Additionally, the duty of one party to
protect the other should exist.118 In this case, the NCAA member-institutions
are responsible for applying and enforcing the rules within the NCAA
Manual.119 Among these rules, the member-institutions are responsible to
protect the health and safety of their student-athletes.120 Therefore, because the
Maryland training and medical staff did not properly diagnose and treat
McNair’s exertional heat stroke, Maryland could potentially be liable for the

112. Manor Real Estate & Trust Co., 176 F.2d at 418.
113. See id.
114. Lanni v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 42 N.E.3d 542, 550 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
115. Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg Coll., 989 F.2d 1360, 1366 (3rd Cir. 1993); see Beckett v. Clinton Prairie
Sch. Corp., 504 N.E.2d 552, 553 (Ind. 1987) (holding schools have a duty to exercise ordinary and reasonable
care for their student-athletes’ safety); see also Benitez v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 541 N.E.2d 29, 29 (N.Y. 1989)
(finding when a student-athlete voluntarily participates in extracurricular athletics, schools owe a reasonable
standard of care).
116. Women First OB/GYN Assoc., L.L.C. v. Harris, 161 A.3d 28, 34 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2017); see
also Blaen Avon Coal Co. v. McCulloh, 59 Md. 403, 418 (Md. 1883) (establishing agents’ commission of a
tort can cause either separate or joint liability for the agents’ employer).
117. S. Mgmt. Corp. v. Taha, 836 A.2d 627, 638 (Md. 2003).
118. Lanni v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 42 N.E.3d 542, 550 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015); see also State of
Md. v. Manor Real Estate & Trust Co., 176 F.2d 414, 418 (4th Cir. 1949).
119. NCAA, supra note 24, at art. 1, 1.3.2.
120. Id. at art. 2, 2.2.3.
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actions of their employees.121 Similarly, it would be possible to bring a wrongful
death claim in Maryland against the NCAA due to its relationship with
Maryland. However, because the NCAA has not voluntarily undertaken the
duty to oversee and control the actions of its member-institutions, it is unlikely
the NCAA would be liable for McNair’s death.
Additionally, a tortfeasor is liable for the deceased’s injury or death as long
as the injury was within the scope of the danger of the activity.122 However,
when there are intervening forces, this chain of causation can be broken if the
action taken is not reasonably foreseeable and outside of the normal activity.123
Here, it is unclear whether the likelihood of the athletic training staff failing to
follow proper protocol regarding this kind of injury was foreseeable,124 and
assuming the Maryland athletic training staff regularly followed protocol, it
would be difficult to prove the NCAA would be liable for their wrongful actions
(i.e., failure to provide adequate cooling and diagnosis of McNair’s exertional
heat stroke symptoms)125 because Maryland had implemented a plan for the
prevention of heat stroke that utilizes the best practices indicated by the NCAA
including assessment of heat stroke risk factors and emergency care for
exertional heat stroke.126 The university acknowledges the failure of the athletic
and medical staff to properly diagnose and treat McNair’s symptoms as well as
the delay in contacting emergency medical services, but it would appear
McNair’s death was preventable.127 Furthermore, it would be unforeseeable
Maryland would fail to comply with its own exertional heat stroke prevention
plan. Therefore, even if the NCAA had a duty to protect its student-athletes, it
would be unlikely for the NCAA to be liable.
Even though a court would likely find Maryland to be liable for Jordan
McNair's death due to Maryland’s special relationship with its student-athletes,
it is unlikely that a court would find the NCAA to be liable for the death because
the NCAA has not voluntarily undertaken the duty to protect its student-athletes,
and it is not reasonably foreseeable that McNair’s death would have occurred.
121. Kirshner, supra note 20; see Independent Evaluation, supra note 7, at 62–64 (observing the staff
failed to provide the necessary and proper medical and safety equipment for football conditioning, failed to
provide immediate and aggressive cooling to McNair, failed to provide acclimatization, failed to follow
emergency protocol, etc.).
122. Copsey v. Park, 160 A.3d 623, 637 (Md. 2017).
123. Id. at 639.
124. Talia Richman, What We Learned from University of Maryland Football Culture Report After Jordan
McNair’s Death, BALT. SUN, Oct. 26, 2018, https://www.baltimoresun.com/sports/terps/tracking-theterps/bs-md-maryland-football-takeaways-20181025-story.html (providing the toxic culture was not directly
responsible for the McNair's death but the dysfunction was rampant within the athletic department as a whole).
125. Independent Evaluation, supra note 7, at 63–64.
126. Id. at 16.
127. Maese & Stubbs, supra note 3.
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C. NCAA Liability in Indiana
Because the NCAA is headquartered in Indiana, an assessment of whether
the NCAA could be liable under the Indiana wrongful death statute would be
helpful. Courts, in Indiana, apply the law where the tort incurred unless there
are no “significant contacts” to apply that state’s law.128 Generally, the place
where the wrongful act took place is significant and considered to be the place
with the most significant contacts,129 and Indiana applies the traditional “lex loci
delicti” rule, which means that the law of the state where the wrong took place
applies.130 However, if that is not the place the tort occurred, other contacts with
the state of Indiana are utilized to determine whether Indiana law will be
applied.131 Indiana’s choice-of-law for tort action incurred outside of the state
is analyzed by the substantial contacts test considering “(1) the place [or places]
where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (2) the residence or place of
business of the parties; and (3) the place where the relationship is centered.”132
This list is not exclusive but any contacts should be “evaluated according to their
relative importance to the particular issue[] being litigated.”133 For Indiana law
to be applied, the contacts must clearly indicate that the alleged tort and its
parties were connected to the state.134
First, the court would assess where the injury occurred to determine whether
significant contacts exist.135 The relevant conduct is defined as the “last
significant act” in which the injury occurred.136 It is undisputed that the conduct
resulting in McNair’s death occurred in the state of Maryland, not Indiana.137
Because McNair’s death occurred in Maryland, the place of the tort is not
connected to Indiana—meaning this factor favors Maryland.138 Therefore, the
place in which the tort incurred does not bear much weight in this case.139 The
128. Simon v. U.S., 341 F.3d 193, 199 (3rd Cir. 2003).
129. Id. at 198–99.
130. Simon v. U.S., 805 N.E.2d 798, 805 (Ind. 2004).
131. Id. (finding the presumption that the state in which the wrong took place is not indisputable); see
Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson 515 N.E.2d 1071, 1073 (Ind. 1987) (finding if the state with the most significant
contacts is another state, the court must consider the parties’ related actions in those states).
132. Simon, 805 N.E.2d at 806; see also 12 AM. JUR. TRIALS 317 (2019).
133. Simon, 341 F.3d at 198-99 (citing Hubbard Mfg. Co., 515 N.E.2d at 1073).
134. See Hubbard Mfg. Co., 515 N.E.2d at 1074 (finding that the Court of Appeals erred when it applied
Illinois law because all three factors indicated there were significant contacts with the state of Indiana).
135. Simon, 341 F.3d at 200.
136. Id. at 204; see also Hubbard Mfg. Co., 515 N.E.2d at 1073.
137. Independent Evaluation, supra note 7, at 25.
138. See Hubbard Mfg. Co., 515 N.E.2d at 1074.
139. Simon v. U.S., 805 N.E.2d 798, 806 (Ind. 2004) (finding the place of the tort to be insignificant
because the tort occurred outside of Indiana and none of the involved parties were Indiana residents).
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second factor to consider is the place of residence or place of business.140 The
NCAA is headquartered in Indiana, which indicates Indiana as its principle
place of business;141 however, because the Maryland staff conducted the
wrongful action in the state of Maryland, this factor does not clearly favor
Maryland or Indiana.142 Thirdly, the center of the parties’ relationship is not
entirely clear because there are no indications that McNair and the NCAA were
ever within the same state143 nor are there any indications that Maryland
frequently visited Indiana.144 Therefore, the third factor does not clearly favor
either forum. While the NCAA is currently headquartered in Indiana, the other
involved parties are not Indiana residents. Because it is unlikely for Indiana’s
law to govern this tort action, it is unnecessary to do a full analysis of Indiana’s
wrongful death statute to determine whether the NCAA could be held liable in
Indiana.
D. Suggestion
NCAA has received ample knowledge about the dangers regarding
exertional heat stroke; therefore, it seems that it would be imperative for an
affirmative duty to be placed upon the NCAA comparable to that imposed on
the NCAA to prevent concussions.145 Eric Breece, the NCAA’s Coordinator of
Championships and Alliances, has stated it is wrong for a student-athlete to get
seriously injured while competing or practicing for a member-institution if the
injury could have been reasonably prevented by safety precautions.146 But it
appears that despite this statement, the NCAA as an association has not
affirmatively asserted any right of control over the treatment of student-athletes’
healthcare at any of their member-institutions because the Sports Medicine
Handbook produced by the NCAA only provides guidance for the memberinstitutions147 and the NCAA Manual gives the duty of student-athlete health
and safety to its member-institutions.148 The Sports Medicine Handbook
specifically states it only provides guidelines—not mandatory rules or
140. Simon, 341 F.3d at 199.
141. Id. at 205.
142. Id. at 199 (finding where the parties have different places of businesses, this factor does not indicate
one state’s jurisdiction over another).
143. Id.
144. Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071, 1074 (Ind. 1987) (finding recurrent visits to Indiana
to conduct business was sufficient to indicate the application of Indiana law).
145. See generally SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 13 (providing multiple references to the
dangers related to heat-related strokes).
146. Lanni v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 42 N.E.3d 542, 543 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
147. Bradley v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 249 F. Supp.3d 149, 173 (D.D.C. 2017).
148. NCAA, supra note 24, at art. 2, 2.2.3.
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regulations—for member-institutions to help create appropriate sports medicine
policies of their own.149 Therefore, the NCAA has not affirmatively and
voluntarily undertaken the responsibility of ensuring member-institutions abide
by these guidelines to protect their student-athletes safety.150 Instead, the
responsibility is deferred to the member-institutions.151
This deferment appears to be antithetical to the commitment described in
the Manual because it seems counterintuitive to “commit” oneself to the health
and safety of student-athletes but fail to create mandatory regulations to ensure
health and safety. For example, almost 4.5 million current and former studentathletes of member-institutions sought a class action suit against the NCAA
asserting the NCAA’s failure to provide adequate guidelines for concussionmanagement to protect student-athletes.152 This class asserted that this failure
on the part of the NCAA put them more at risk for subsequent concussions.153
In considering the proposed settlement, the court found determinations of
whether the NCAA breached a duty to protects its student-athletes requires
individual fact-based determinations regarding concussion-related risks because
the nature and the extent of the applicable concussion protocols are essential to
the plaintiffs’ claims against the NCAA, which largely vary depending on the
actions taken by both the NCAA and the particular member-institution.154 Thus,
assumptions of the NCAA’s legal duty to protect student-athletes health are
insufficient on their own to establish that NCAA liability nationwide even if the
NCAA had a legal duty to know what every school was doing regarding
concussions during the relevant period.155 While the settlement does not
expressly acknowledge whether the NCAA had a duty to know what every
member-institution was doing for all of its sports for concussion protocol,156 the
court indicates a high degree of causation where there is a bodily injury class
action depends on the rules, equipment, circumstances, and involved staff
adopted for each individual sport.157 Therefore, due to the fact-intensive nature,
it would be unlikely for a class action suit to span multiple sports and multiple
149. SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 12.
150. Bradley, 249 F. Supp.3d at 174; Lanni, 42 N.E.3d at 553.
151. SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 2.
152. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Student Athlete Concussion Injury Litig., 314 F.R.D. 580, 584,
593 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
153. Id. at 585.
154. Id. at 594-95 (establishing individual actions would better suit the needs of the plaintiffs).
155. Id. (refusing to find the NCAA had a duty to regulate and enforce safety rules upon its member
institutions).
156. Id. at 594.
157. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Student-Athlete Concussion Injury Litig., MDL No. 2492, 2016
WL 3854603, *6, (N.D. Ill. 2016).
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member-institutions.158 Instead, the governing law is from the state in which
the wrongful act took place, which prohibits any nationwide personal injury
class action suits.159
It is evident from this class action settlement that there was such a broad
variation among member-institutions’ implementations of concussion
protocol.160 For example, some schools merely warned student-athletes about
the risk of head injuries and concussion; whereas, some schools provided
baseline testing for concussions in addition to warnings.161 Therefore, the court
could not conclude that the class was injured in the same way.162 But it still
appears to not be completely logical for the NCAA’s lack of duty to protect
student-athletes when there is a complete lack of consistency of implementing
concussion protocol across the different sports and all NCAA memberinstitutions.163 The NCAA acknowledged the possible dangers of concussions
in 1999 when they conducted a study examining the effects of concussions in
former student-athletes who participated in football.164 Additionally, in an
annual survey provided to the NCAA regarding football-related fatalities,
concern with concussion and brain injury fatalities was of the utmost
importance.165 Therefore, it is difficult to imagine why the NCAA, who has
established a “commitment” to student-athlete health and safety, would fail to
provide better protection to its student-athletes especially with twenty years of
knowledge regarding the dangers of concussions and head injury.166
Previous cases have generally ruled that the NCAA has no affirmative duty
to protect the physical and mental health and safety of its student-athletes while
student-athletes are participating in intercollegiate athletics despite producing
policy and medical guidelines enacted for the protection of student-athletes.167
158. Id.
159. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Student Athlete Concussion Injury Litig., 314 F.R.D. at 596.
160. Id. at 593.
161. Id. at 593-94.
162. Id. at 595.
163. Id. at 594.
164. Brian Burnsed, NCAA Funds Study Examining the Long-Term Effects of Concussions in Sports,
NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/sport-science-institute/ncaa-funds-study-examining-long-term-effectsconcussions- sports (last visited Apr. 24, 2020).
165. See generally KUCERA, supra note 28.
166. See Burnsed, supra note 164.
167. See Bradley v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 249 F.Supp.3d 149, 168 (D.D.C. 2017) (rejecting the
defendant’s motion to dismiss because it was not completely clear the defendant’s actions were not negligent
nor resulting from a duty); see also McCants v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 201 F. Supp.3d 732, 740
(M.D.N.C. 2016) (finding the NCAA did not partake in specific, affirmative conduct to render a voluntary
undertaking to protect student-athlete educational opportunities); see also Lanni v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
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Similarly to the concussion settlement where the NCAA lacked a duty to enforce
uniform concussion protocol in an effort to better protect student-athletes from
head trauma, the NCAA has no duty to know and enforce every member
institution’s plan regarding exertional heat stroke.168 Even though the duty of
the health and safety of student-athletes does not fall to the NCAA but rather to
each member-institution, it would seem counter-intuitive that the NCAA as a
whole does not have any kind of affirmative duty to ensure compliance, which
was reiterated in the concussion settlement.169
This seemingly antithetical finding of the courts applies equally to both
concussion protocol and exertional health and safety. The NCAA Manual
establishes NCAA commitment to student-athlete well-being by establishing an
environment that fosters safety between the student-athletes and the memberinstitutions’ representatives.170 But is it really committed to student-athlete
health and safety when the NCAA has failed to implement policies and
procedures that actually protect student-athlete health and safety, especially in
the case of concussion protocol and exertional heat stroke? The NCAA’s lack
of liability despite their apparent “commitment” to student-athlete well-being is
nonsensical when there is a well-documented risk of athletes experiencing
exertional heat stroke as well as complications as a result of brain injuries or
concussions.171 Similarly, it is known and therefore foreseeable that
concussions and head trauma can result in chronic traumatic encephalopathy
(CTE), depression, lowered cognitive functioning, etc.,172 and as a result of this
knowledge, the NCAA implemented its “Concussion Safety Protocol”
following the concussion litigation requiring involvement from the NCAA
regarding the implementation of each member-institution’s concussion safety
protocol.173 This change potentially created an affirmative duty to help memberinstitutions in ensuring concussion safety by the NCAA.174 However, unlike the
potential duty created by the implementation of the Concussion Safety Protocol,
a similar rule had not been launched by the NCAA for exertional heat stroke.
Ass’n, 42 N.E.3d 542, 553 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (finding the plaintiff failed to illustrate that the NCAA owed
a duty to their student-athletes).
168. Bradley, 249 F. Supp.3d at 173.
169. NCAA, supra note 24, at art. 2, 2.2.3.
170. Id. at “Commitments to the Division I Collegiate Model.”
171. See Independent Evaluation, supra note 7, at 4; SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 56–
57 (Aug. 2014). KUCERA, supra note 28, at 11–12 (providing a multitude of recommendations and sources to
create proper concussion protocol for football programs).
172. In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d 410, 421 (3rd Cir. 2016); In
re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Student Athlete Concussion Injury Litig., 314 F.R.D. 580, 593 (N.D. Ill.
2016).
173. See generally NCAA, supra note 24, at art. 3, 3.2.4.18.1.
174. See Schmitz v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 67 N.E.3d 852, 867–68 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016).

SOLLESTRE – COMMENT 30.2

412

MARQUET T E SPORT S L AW REVIEW

9/11/2020 10:32 PM

[Vol. 30:2

According to experts, exertional heat stroke is survivable when the person is
cooled down to below 104 degrees.175 As indicated in the NCAA's Sports
Medicine Handbook, there are several ways the NCAA outlined to both identify
and prevent exertional heat stroke in student-athletes,176 but because the
NCAA’s handbook is only meant to provide guidelines for its memberinstitutions, there is no duty of care required of the NCAA beyond a duty to
provide its member-institutions with health and safety information for its
student-athletes. The only mention of any heat-related injuries or strokes is in
the requirement of member-institutions to report any “student-athlete
catastrophic fatalities, near fatalities and catastrophic injuries”177 annually to the
NCAA. This regulation does not require any member-institutions to take any
particular action regarding the implementation of an NCAA safety protocol for
exertional heat stroke.178 However, the lack of duty and regulation does not
make sense, especially considering the foreseeability of complications due to
improper diagnosis of exertional heat stroke in student-athletes—especially
those competing in warm temperatures—or a complete failure to diagnose
exertional heat stroke like in Jordan McNair’s case.179
Due to the knowledge regarding heat stroke, the NCAA should
affirmatively accept the same kind of duty for exertional heat stroke based both
on the knowledge available and the potential for detrimental health risks
associated with exertional heat stroke as it did with concussions. As it is
currently, the NCAA only has duties to guide and inform member-institutions
and their student-athletes about health and safety risks,180 but due to the
detrimental and preventable health risks concerning heat stroke when not
properly diagnosed and treated, the NCAA should deliberately create a duty to
ensure the safety of its athletes by insuring its member-institutions comply with
protocol. The NCAA had outlined numerous risk factors including dehydration,
improper acclimatization, high heat and humidity combination, and the intensity
of exercise; these risk factors are indications that exertional heat stroke would
be foreseeable if the risk factors are met.181 Additionally, according to research,
an extremely high percentage of people cooled to the proper temperature within
175. Independent Evaluation, supra note 7, at 6. Melissa Block, Researching Heatstroke in Athletes, NPR
(Aug. 26, 2018, 8:46 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/26/642008040/researching-heatstroke-in-athletes.
176. SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 39–40.
177. NCAA, supra note 24, at art. 3, 3.2.4.19.
178. See id.
179. KUCERA, supra note 28, at 14. Block, supra note 175 (explaining that due to student-athletes’ lack
of power, the NCAA has the responsibility to ensure injuries like complication with heat stroke can no longer
occurring any sport including football).
180. Lanni v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 42 N.E.3d 542, 553 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
181. See generally SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 41-42.
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thirty minutes of exhibiting heat stroke symptoms survived heat stroke.182
Therefore, it would be a disgrace and an antithesis to the commitments outlined
in the NCAA Manual for the NCAA not to do everything in its power to ensure
student-athletes are competing in a safe environment.183 In the words of Eric
Breece, the NCAA’s Coordinator of Championships and Alliances, “‘any
serious injury’ at an NCAA event ‘is unacceptable if reasonable safety measures
could prevent’ the injury.”184
V. CONCLUSION
The tragedy of Jordan McNair’s death as a result of heat stroke while
practicing for the University of Maryland football team should not have
occurred. Numerous mistakes were made by the athletic training staff including
failure to properly diagnose and treat McNair’s exertional heat stroke, failure to
acclimate McNair after a four-week break, lack of immediate cooling, and
failure to promptly call 9-1-1.185 This incident is one that has shocked millions
of people across the country, and in light of the horrors surrounding other recent
athletic institutions’ missteps, it is one that will be scrutinized closely. While
there is no way of knowing definitively how the lawsuit is going to turn out, one
thing is for certain: currently, the NCAA is unlikely to have a duty to ensure and
protect the health and safety of its student-athletes because that duty lies solely
on each member-institution and the NCAA has not deliberately and voluntarily
undertaken that duty. It is the harsh truth; however, it only takes one incident
to turn the tide. While it is confusing and maybe even despicable that the NCAA
lacks a duty to protect the well-being of the student-athletes at its memberinstitution, this case could potentially implement a duty to ensure that its
member-institutions are properly following protocol especially concerning a
medical stroke that could have been easily remedied.

182. Block, supra note 175; KUCERA, supra note 28, at 15.
183. NCAA, supra note 24, at “Commitments to the Division I Collegiate Model.”
184. Lanni, 42 N.E.3d at 543.
185. See generally Independent Evaluation, supra note 7, at 62-66.

